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Vision: Attending the Invisible
In everyday vision, attention and awareness are hand in glove and almost
impossible to tell apart. Recent work has exploited more contrived
situations that allow these psychologically defined processes to be
dissociated, providing insights into their respective neurophysiological
correlates.Jochen Braun
People working on vision have
developed an odd taste for invisible
things. More and more reports are
being published of large objects in
plain view that fail, in one way or
another, to reach the observer’s
awareness. Well-known cases
in point include binocular rivalry
[1], flash suppression [2] and
motion-induced blindness [3]. The
reason for the surge of interest
is that the stimuli in question,
while invisible to the observer,
nevertheless evoke robust
neuronal responses up and down
the visual pathways. Comparing
neuronal responses to visible and
to invisible stimuli may lead, so
goes the widely shared hope, to no
lesser objective than a neural
correlate of visual awareness.
Particularly promising in this
regard are invisible stimuli that
elicit neural activity even in higher
areas of visual cortex, as normally
visible stimuli do. A text-book
example was recently devised by
Fang and He [4], who rendered
visual objects invisible by
interocular suppression.
Specifically, they showed low-
contrast images of tools or faces to
one eye and suppressed
awareness with high-contrast,
dynamic noise images presented
to the other eye. In a forced choice
task, observers were unable to
detect the suppressed object
images, confirming their complete
lack of awareness. To map cortical
activation, the authors established
functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) responses to intact
object images, with responses to
scrambled object images providing
a suitable baseline.
Fang and He [4] found that, in
spite of their invisibility, toolimages activated dorsal visual
areas along the intraparietal sulcus
at almost normal levels, but did not
activate ventral visual areas of the
lateral occipital complex. In the
case of face images, the interocular
suppression prevented activation
of both ventral and dorsal visual
cortex. Two salient conclusions
emerge from this fascinating
study: dorsal areas respond to
certain object classes, such as
tools, in spite of interocular
suppression; and awareness is
once again seen to correlate with
ventral activation, in agreement
with the conventional notion that
conscious visual perception is
supported by ventral (not dorsal)
visual cortex [5].
In this issue of Current Biology,
Bahrami et al. [6] report work which
takes the paradigm of invisible tool
images several steps further. Using
some tricks to enhance neuronal
responses without jeopardizing
invisibility, the authors investigatedearlier visual areas, where the
activated cortical site depends on
stimulus position in the visual field.
Comparing different placements of
invisible stimuli in the peripheral
visual field, the authors identified
fMRI activations in response to
invisible tool images in visual areas
V1, V2 and V3. As this comparison
did not yield activations in higher
areas — where responses are less
sensitive to stimulus position — the
information gained is neatly
complementary to that of Fang
and He [4].
But Bahrami et al. [6] did not stop
at keeping tool images out of visual
awareness: they also drew
observers’ attention away from the
peripheral locations at which tool
and noise images are being
presented, albeit to different eyes
(Figure 1). To this end, observers
were asked to monitor a slow
stream of letters at the center of the
visual field and to report the
appearance of particular target
letters, with different task
instructions engaging visual
attention to different degrees:
complex instructions, such as
‘‘report blue ‘Z’s and white ‘N’s’’,
drawing more attention than simpleN N
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Figure 1. A schematic representation of the display used by Bahrami et al. [6].
At peripheral locations, one eye views high-contrast, dynamic noise images that are
visible to the observer. At some of the same locations, the other eye views low-contrast
tool objects that remain invisible. Both eyes view identical letters at the center of the
visual field. The complexity of a letter-monitoring task controls the extent to which
peripheral images are attended.
Bacterial Cell Cycle: Completing
the Circuit
Recent advances in understanding bacterial cell-cycle regulation
suggest circuit control mechanisms that operate analogously to those in
the eukaryotic cell cycle.
Joseph C. Chen1
and Craig Stephens2
The cell cycle can be thought
of as a ‘circuit’ of regulatory
components which, by enabling an
efficient flow of information,
triggers events critical for cellular
reproduction. Like industrial spies
in Silicon Valley, biologists are
trying to peer into cells to map out
their circuit components and
connections. New work on the
bacterium Caulobacter crescentus
has, for the first time, laid out
connections between key
regulators of all the major events
in this microbe’s cell cycle [1].
The design principles of the
Caulobacter circuit parallel those
used in the yeast Saccharomyces
cerevisiae [2], a model for studies
of the eukaryotic cell cycle,
suggesting that these principles
may be of fundamental
importance.
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R203instructions, such as ‘‘report ‘T’s of
any color’’. Without this letter
monitoring task, the rapidly
flashing noise images, which
conceal the invisible tool images,
would presumably capture and
hold the observers’ visual attention
in the peripheral visual field. So
what did Bahrami et al. [6] hope to
achieve by removing both
awareness and attention?
To understand, we need to recall
some basic facts about attention.
In our subjective visual experience,
we encounter attention in the form
of visual effort and voluntary
control. Formally, attention
selectively enhances and
attenuates visual processing to
meet current behavioural goals [7].
Attention is not associated with
one particular brain site, but seems
to result from dynamic interactions
between multiple brain areas
encoding visual and goal
information [8,9]. When a given
stimulus is selected by attention,
it typically evokes stronger
responses at all neural levels: in the
visual thalamus, in early retinotopic
areas of cortex, and in higher areas
of the ventral and dorsal visual
cortex [10]. Psychophysical
evidence shows many qualitative
and quantitative improvements in
the visual awareness of an
attended stimulus [11].
What Bahrami et al. [6] did,
therefore, was to ask whether
attention modulates responses
evoked by an invisible image. In
fact, they found that the fMRI
activation by invisible tool images
did indeed prove higher when
attention was allowed to select the
image locations — with simple
letter monitoring — than when
attention was assiduously drawn
away — with complex letter
monitoring. This result, which was
obtained in all three investigated
areas (V1, V2 and V3), implies that
a neuronal response need not
contribute to visual awareness,
even though it is enhanced by
visual attention. In short, attention
does not guarantee awareness.
The dissociation observed by
Bahrami et al. [6] — attention
without awareness — reinforces
previous reports of the opposite
dissociation, namely, that
observers tend to be aware of
salient stimuli outside the currentfocus of attention — awareness
without attention [11,12]. It looks
less and less likely, therefore,
that a neural correlate of visual
awareness, which is the ultimate
goal of this line of research, will
bear a close resemblance to the
neural basis of attention [13]. The
question remains wide open, as to
what form a neural correlate of
awareness may take — activity
of particular cell types, activity of
particular areas or connections, or
particular forms distributed activity
have been considered, with plenty
of other possibilities offering to
a fertile imagination. The
contribution of studies such as
those by Fang and He [4] and by
Bahrami et al. [6] lies in the
neurophysiological dissociation
of psychologically defined
processes — attention and
awareness — that normally operate
in tandem and are thus all too easy
to conflate.
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